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Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Pro t Maximization, and Information Disclosure
15 years 10 months ago
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www.kellogg.northwestern.edu
A presentation about Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Pro t Maximization, and Information Disclosure.
Alessandro Pavan, Ilya Segal, Juuso Toikka
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Dynamic Mechanism Design
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posted by
sujit
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Added
27 Jan 2009
Updated
22 Apr 2009
Authors
Alessandro Pavan, Ilya Segal, Juuso Toikka
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Researcher Info
sujit
Student, PhD
Indian Institute of Science
non-author
43
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