Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Round-Reduced and Side Channel Analysis of the Full PRINTCipher-48

Abstract. In this paper we analyze the recently proposed light-weight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 with only 2 known plaintexts and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity. We investigate applicability of our method to cryptanalysis of the full PRINTCipher-48.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: CANS
• Authors: Stanislav Bulygin, Johannes Buchmann
• Keywords: Algebraic Methods, Block Cipher, CANS 2011, Cryptology, Simulation Side