Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm

In the arena of automated negotiations we focus on the principal negotiation protocol in bilateral settings, i.e. the alternatingoffers protocol. In the scientific community it is common the idea that bargaining in the alternating-offers protocol will play a crucial role in the automation of electronic transactions. Notwithstanding its prominence, literature does not present a satisfactory solution to the alternating-offers protocol in real-world settings, e.g. in presence of uncertainty. In this paper we game theoretically analyze this negotiation problem with one-sided uncertain deadlines and we provide an efficient solving algorithm. Specifically, we analyze the situation where the values of the parameters of the buyer are uncertain to the seller, whereas the parameters of the seller are common knowledge (the analysis of the reverse situation is analogous). In this particular situation the results present in literature are not satisfactory, since they do not assure the existence of...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: AI
• Authors: Nicola Gatti, Francesco Di Giunta, Stefano Marino
• Keywords: AI 2008, Artificial Intelligence, Choice Rule, Principal Negotiation Protocol, Time Point