Analysing Unlinkability and Anonymity Using the Applied Pi Calculus

—An attacker that can identify messages as coming from the same source, can use this information to build up a picture of targets’ behaviour, and so, threaten their privacy. In response to this danger, unlinkable protocols aim to make it impossible for a third party to identify two runs of a protocol as coming from the same device. We present a framework for analysing unlinkability and anonymity in the applied pi calculus. We show that unlinkability and anonymity are complementary properties; one does not imply the other. Using our framework we show that the French RFID e-passport preserves anonymity but it is linkable therefore anyone carrying a French e-passport can be physically traced.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: CSFW
• Authors: Myrto Arapinis, Tom Chothia, Eike Ritter, Mark Ryan
• Keywords: Anonymity, Applied Pi Calculus, CSFW 2010, Security Privacy, —An Attacker