Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels

Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2001
• Where: EUROCRYPT
• Authors: Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk
• Keywords: Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 2001, Important Analytical Benefits, Key-exchange Protocols, Security