Analytical Study of Adversarial Strategies in Cluster-based Overlays

Abstract—Awerbuch and Scheideler have shown that peerto-peer overlays networks can survive Byzantine attacks only if malicious nodes are not able to predict what will be the topology of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. In this paper we investigate adversarial strategies by following specific protocols. Our analysis demonstrates first that an adversary can very quickly subvert DHT-based overlays by simply never triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes (honest and malicious ones) are imposed on a limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a stationary regime where the ratio of polluted clusters is bounded, independently from the initial amount of corruption in the system. Keywords-Clusterized P2P Overlays, Adversary, Churn, Collusion, Markov chain.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: PDCAT
• Authors: Emmanuelle Anceaume, Francisco V. Brasileiro, Romaric Ludinard, Bruno Sericola, Frédéric Tronel
• Keywords: Distributed And Parallel Computing, Malicious Nodes, PDCAT 2009, Peerto-peer Overlays Networks, Subvert Dht-based Overlays