Auction Equilibrium Strategies for Task Allocation in Uncertain Environments

Abstract. In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tasks dynamically arrive from a central manager. The agents differ in their capabilities to perform a task under different world states. Previous models concerning cooperative agents aiming for a joint goal are not applicable in such environments, since self interested agents have a motivation to deviate from the joint allocation strategy, in order to increase their own benefits. Given the allocation protocol set by the central manager, a stable solution, is a set of strategies, derived from an equilibrium where no agent can benefit from changing its strategy given the other agents' strategies. Specifically we focus on a protocol in which, upon arrival of a new task, the central manager starts a reverse auction among the agents, and the agent who bids the lowest cost wins. We introduce the model, formulate ...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: CIA
• Authors: David Sarne, Meirav Hadad, Sarit Kraus
• Keywords: Central Manager, CIA 2004, Intelligent Agents, Interested Information Agents, Self Interested Agents