Beyond Equilibrium: Predicting Human Behavior in Normal-Form Games

It is standard in multiagent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies. However, studies in experimental economics demonstrate that Nash equilibrium is a poor description of human players' initial behavior in normal-form games. In this paper, we consider a wide range of widely-studied models from behavioral game theory. For what we believe is the first time, we evaluate each of these models in a meta-analysis, taking as our data set large-scale and publicly-available experimental data from the literature. We then propose modifications to the best-performing model that we believe make it more suitable for practical prediction of initial play by humans in normal-form games.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: AAAI
• Authors: James R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown
• Keywords: AAAI 2010, Intelligent Agents, Nash Equilibrium, Nash Equilibrium Strategies, Normal-form Games