Bilateral Bargaining with One-Sided Two-Type Uncertainty

It is a challenging problem to find agents’ rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. In this paper we perform a game theoretic analysis of agents’ rational strategies in finite horizon bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices. The negotiation setting considered in this paper has four features: alternating-offers bargaining protocol, finite horizon, two-type uncertainty about agents’ reserve prices, and discount factors. The main contribution of this paper is the development of a novel algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in the setting we study. Our algorithm is based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: IAT
• Authors: Bo An, Nicola Gatti, Victor R. Lesser
• Keywords: Bargaining, Game Theoretic Analysis, IAT 2009, Intelligent Agent, Rational Strategies