BiTR: Built-in Tamper Resilience

The assumption of the availability of tamper-proof hardware tokens has been used extensively in the design of cryptographic primitives. For example, Katz (Eurocrypt 2007) suggests them as an alternative to other setup assumptions, towards achieving general UC-secure multi-party computation. On the other hand, a lot of recent research has focused on protecting security of various cryptographic primitives against physical attacks such as leakage and tampering. In this paper we put forward the notion of Built-in Tamper Resilience (BiTR) for cryptographic protocols, capturing the idea that the protocol that is encapsulated in a hardware token is designed in such a way so that tampering gives no advantage to an adversary. Our definition is within the UC model, and can be viewed as unifying and extending several prior related works. We provide a composition theorem for BiTR security of protocols, impossibility results, as well as several BiTR constructions for specific cryptographic protoc...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: ASIACRYPT
• Authors: Seung Geol Choi, Aggelos Kiayias, Tal Malkin
• Keywords: ASIACRYPT 2011, Composition Theorem, Cryptographic Primitives, Cryptology, Hardware Tokens