Black-Box Constructions of Protocols for Secure Computation

In this paper, we study the question of whether or not it is possible to construct protocols for general secure computation in the setting of malicious adversaries and no honest majority that use the underlying primitive (e.g., enhanced trapdoor permutation) in a black-box way only. Until now, all known general constructions for this setting were inherently non-blackbox since they required the parties to prove zero-knowledge statements that are related to the computation of the underlying primitive. Our main technical result is a fully black-box reduction from oblivious transfer with security against malicious parties to oblivious transfer with security against semi-honest parties. As a corollary, we obtain the first constructions of general multiparty protocols (with security against malicious adversaries and without an honest majority) which only make a black-box use of semi-honest oblivious transfer, or alternatively a black-box use of lower-level primitives such as enhanced trapd...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: SIAMCOMP
• Authors: Iftach Haitner, Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Yehuda Lindell, Erez Petrank
• Keywords: Black-box, Defensible Oblivious Transfer, Oblivious Transfer, SIAMCOMP 2011, Software Engineering