Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: The Case of AES

We describe several software side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU's memory cache. This leakage reveals memory access patterns, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups. The attacks allow an unprivileged process to attack other processes running in parallel on the same processor, despite partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing and virtualization. Some of our methods require only the ability to trigger services that perform encryption or MAC using the unknown key, such as encrypted disk partitions or secure network links. Moreover, we demonstrate an extremely strong type of attack, which requires knowledge of neither the specific plaintexts nor ciphertexts, and works by merely monitoring the effect of the cryptographic process on the cache. We discuss in detail several such attacks on AES, and experimentally demonstrate their applicability to real systems, s...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: CTRSA
• Authors: Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, Eran Tromer
• Keywords: CPU's Memory Cache, Cryptology, CTRSA 2006, Leakage Reveals Memory, Software Side-channel Attacks