Cryptanalysis of the LAKE Hash Family

We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack uses differences in the chaining values and the block counter and finds collisions with complexity 233 . The second attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt and yields collisions with complexity 242 . The final attack uses differences only in the chaining values to yield near-collisions with complexity 299 . All our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in the compression function. We illustrate the first two attacks by showing examples of collisions and near-collisions.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: FSE
• Authors: Alex Biryukov, Praveen Gauravaram, Jian Guo, Dmitry Khovratovich, San Ling, Krystian Matusiewicz, Ivica Nikolic, Josef Pieprzyk, Huaxiong Wang
• Keywords: Attack Uses Differences, Chaining, Compression Function, Cryptology, FSE 2009