Cryptanalysis of the Paeng-Jung-Ha Cryptosystem from PKC 2003

At PKC 2003 Paeng, Jung, and Ha proposed a lattice based public key cryptosystem(PJH). It is originated from GGH, and designed as a hybrid of GGH and NTRUEncrypt in order to reduce the key size. They claimed that PJH is secure against all possible attacks, especially against lattice attacks. However, in this paper, we present a key recovery attack, based on lattice theory, against PJH. The running time of our attack is drastically short. For example, we could recover all secret keys within 10 minutes even for the system with n = 1001 on a single PC. Unlike other lattice attacks against NTRUEncrypt and GGH, the attack may be applied well to the system with much larger parameters. We present some clues why we believe so. Based on this belief, we declare that PJH should not be used in practice.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: PKC
• Authors: Daewan Han, Myung-Hwan Kim, Yongjin Yeom
• Keywords: Cryptography, Key Recovery Attack, Lattice Attacks, Pkc 2003 Paeng, PKC 2007