A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem

In this work we use cryptography to solve a game-theoretic problem which arises naturally in the area of two party strategic games. The standard game-theoretic solution concept for such games is that of an equilibrium, which is a pair of “self-enforcing” strategies making each player’s strategy an optimal response to the other player’s strategy. It is known that for many games the expected equilibrium payoffs can be much higher when a trusted third party (a “mediator”) assists the players in choosing their moves (correlated equilibria), than when each player has to choose its move on its own (Nash equilibria). It is natural to ask whether there exists a mechanism that eliminates the need for the mediator yet allows the players to maintain the high payoffs offered by mediator-assisted strategies. We answer this question affirmatively provided the players are computationally bounded and can have free communication (so-called “cheap talk”) prior to playing the game. The...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2000
• Where: CRYPTO
• Authors: Yevgeniy Dodis, Shai Halevi, Tal Rabin
• Keywords: CRYPTO 2000, Cryptographic Protocols, Cryptology, Game-theoretic, Game-theoretic Solution Concept