Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models, Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design

— Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, Francesco Bullo
• Keywords: CORR 2011, Education, Future Power Networks, Linear Time-invariant Descriptor, Network Components Malfunction