Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer

Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the more recent Ethereum system allow users to specify scripts in transactions and contracts to support applications beyond simple cash transactions. In this work, we analyze the extent to which these systems can enforce the correct semantics of scripts. We show that when a script execution requires nontrivial computation effort, practical attacks exist which either waste miners’ computational resources or lead miners to accept incorrect script results. These attacks drive miners to an illfated choice, which we call the verifier’s dilemma, whereby rational miners are well-incentivized to accept unvalidated blockchains. We call the framework of computation through a scriptable cryptocurrency a consensus computer and develop a model that captures incentives for verifying computation in it. We propose a resolution to the verifier’s dilemma which incentivizes correct execution of certain applications, including outsourced computation, where scrip...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: CCS
• Authors: Loi Luu, Jason Teutsch, Raghav Kulkarni, Prateek Saxena
• Keywords: CCS 2015, Security Privacy