Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?

We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated costsharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source s and sink t is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an s-t path, knowing that the cost of each edge is shared equally between all agents using it. Two variants of cost-sharing games have been previously studied: (i) games where coalitions can form, and (ii) games where edges are associated with capacities; both variants are inspired by real-life scenarios. In this work we combine these variants and analyze strong equilibria (profiles where no coalition can deviate) in capacitated games. This combination gives rise to new phenomena that do not occur in the previous variants. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we provide a topological characterization of networks that always admit a strong equilibrium. Second, we establish tight bounds on the efficiency loss that may be incurred due to strategic behavior, as quantified...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: AAAI
• Authors: Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
• Keywords: AAAI 2015, Intelligent Agents