A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs

In response to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Mumbai police have started to schedule a limited number of inspection checkpoints on the road network throughout the city. Algorithms for similar security-related scheduling problems have been proposed in recent literature, but security scheduling in networked domains when targets have varying importance remains an open problem at large. In this paper, we cast the network security problem as an attackerdefender zero-sum game. The strategy spaces for both players are exponentially large, so this requires the development of novel, scalable techniques. We first show that existing algorithms for approximate solutions can be arbitrarily bad in general settings. We present RUGGED (Randomization in Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and Defender), the first scalable optimal solution technique for such network security games. Our technique is based on a double oracle approach and thus does not require the enumeration of the entire ...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Manish Jain, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, Milind Tambe
• Keywords: ATAL 2011, Intelligent Agents, Realistic Problem, Zero Sum Game, Zero Sum Games