Efficient Countermeasures against RPA, DPA, and SPA

In the execution on a smart card, side channel attacks such as simple power analysis (SPA) and the differential power analysis (DPA) have become serious threat [15]. Side channel attacks monitor power consumption and even exploit the leakage information related to power consumption to reveal bits of a secret key d although d is hidden inside a smart card. Almost public key cryptosystems including RSA, DLP-based cryptosystems, and elliptic curve cryptosystems execute an exponentiation algorithm with a secret-key exponent, and they thus suffer from both SPA and DPA. Recently, in the case of elliptic curve cryptosystems, DPA is improved to the Refined Power Analysis (RPA), which exploits a special point with a zero value and reveals a secret key [10]. RPA is further generalized to Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) [2]. Both RPA and ZPA utilizes a special feature of elliptic curves that happens to have a special point or a register used in addition and doubling formulae with a zero value and t...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: CHES
• Authors: Hideyo Mamiya, Atsuko Miyaji, Hiroaki Morimoto
• Keywords: CHES 2004, Cryptology, Elliptic Curve, Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems, Power Consumption