On Efficient Procedures for Multi-issue Negotiation

This paper studies bilateral, multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents with deadlines. There are a number of procedures for negotiating the issues and each of these gives a different outcome. Thus, a key problem is to decide which one to use. Given this, we study the three main alternatives: the package deal, the simultaneous procedure, and the sequential procedure. First, we determine equilibria for the case where each agent is uncertain about its opponent's deadline. We then compare the outcomes for these procedures and determine the one that is optimal (in this case, the package deal is optimal for each party). We then compare the procedures in terms of their time complexity, the uniqueness and Pareto optimality of their solutions, and their time of agreement.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings
• Keywords: ATAL 2006, Intelligent Agents, Multi-issue Negotiation, Package Deal, Procedures