An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries

We show an efficient secure two-party protocol, based on Yao's construction, which provides security against malicious adversaries. Yao's original protocol is only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and can be transformed into a protocol that achieves security against malicious adversaries by applying the compiler of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (the "GMW compiler"). However, this approach does not seem to be very practical as it requires using generic zero-knowledge proofs. Our construction is based on applying cut-and-choose techniques to the original circuit and inputs. Security is proved according to the ideal/real simulation paradigm, and the proof is in the standard model (with no random oracle model or common reference string assumptions). The resulting protocol is computationally efficient: the only usage of asymmetric cryptography is for running O(1) oblivious transfers for each input bit (or for each bit of a statistical security parame...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: EUROCRYPT
• Authors: Yehuda Lindell, Benny Pinkas
• Keywords: Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 2007, Oblivious Transfer, Secure Two-party Computation, Secure Two-party Protocol