An Empirical Study of Borda Manipulation

We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form of two new greedy manipulation algorithms based on intuitions from the bin-packing and multiprocessor scheduling domains. Although we have not been able to show that these algorithms beat existing methods in the worst-case, our empirical evaluation shows that they significantly outperform the existing method and are able to find optimal manipulations in the vast majority of the randomly generated elections that we tested. These empirical results provide further evidence that the Borda rule provides little defense against coalitional manipulation.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Jessica Davies, George Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh
• Keywords: Borda Rule, Coalitional Manipulation, CORR 2010, Education, Unweighted Borda Rule