On the establishment of distinct identities in overlay networks

Abstract We study ways to restrict or prevent the damage that can be caused in a peer-to-peer network by corrupt entities creating multiple pseudonyms. We show that it is possible to remotely issue certificates that can be used to test the distinctness of identities. Our certification protocols are based on geometric techniques that establish location information in a fault-tolerant and distributed fashion. They do not rely on a centralized certifying authority or infrastructure that has direct knowledge of entities in the system, and work in Euclidean or spherical geometry of arbitrary dimension. They tolerate corrupt entities, including corrupt certifiers, collusion by either certification applicants or certifiers, and either a broadcast or point-to-point message model. Keywords sybil attack · identity verification · overlay networks · peer-to-peer systems · distance geometry

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: PODC
• Authors: Rida A. Bazzi, Goran Konjevod
• Keywords: Centralized Certifying Authority, Corrupt Entities, Distributed And Parallel Computing, Peer-to-peer Network, PODC 2005