Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections

In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2012
• Where: AAAI
• Authors: Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
• Keywords: AAAI 2012, Correct Outcome, False Name, Intelligent Agents, Mechanism Designer