Sciweavers

Free Online Productivity Tools i2Speak i2Symbol i2OCR iTex2Img iWeb2Print iWeb2Shot i2Type iPdf2Split iPdf2Merge i2Bopomofo i2Arabic i2Style i2Image i2PDF iLatex2Rtf Sci2ools

33

FOCS
2004
IEEE

favoriteEmaildiscussreport

86views Theoretical Computer Science» more FOCS 2004»

Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game

14 years 2 months ago

Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game

Download www.maths.lse.ac.uk

The Lemke

Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel

Real-time Traffic

Bimatrix Games | FOCS 2004 | LemkeHowson Algorithm | Parity Argument | Theoretical Computer Science |

claim paper

Related Content

» Approximate Nash Equilibria under Stability Conditions

» Circumventing the Price of Anarchy Leading Dynamics to Good Behavior

Post Info
More Details (n/a)

Added	20 Aug 2010
Updated	20 Aug 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2004
Where	FOCS
Authors	Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel

Comments (0)