Extending Classical Planning to the Multi-agent Case: A Game-Theoretic Approach

When several agents operate in a common environment, their plans may interfere so that the predicted outcome of each plan may be altered, even if it is composed of deterministic actions, only. Most of the multi-agent planning frameworks either view the actions of the other agents as exogeneous events or consider goal sharing cooperative agents. In this paper, we depart from such frameworks and extend the well-known single agent framework for classical planning to a multi-agent one. Focusing on the two agents case, we show how valuable plans can be characterized using game-theoretic notions, especially Nash equilibrium.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: ECSQARU
• Authors: Ramzi Ben Larbi, Sébastien Konieczny, Pierre Marquis
• Keywords: ECSQARU 2007, Multi-agent Planning Frameworks, Sharing Cooperative Agents, Well-known Single Agent