An extension of duality to a game-theoretic framework

This paper extends some duality results from a standard optimization setup to a noncooperative (Nash) game framework. A Nash game (NG) with coupled constraints is considered. Solving directly such a coupled NG requires coordination among possibly all players. An alternative approach is proposed based on its relation to a special constrained optimization problem for the NG-game cost function, with respect to the second argument that admits a fixed-point solution. Specific separability properties of the NG-game cost are exploited and duality results are developed. This duality extension leads naturally to a hierarchical decomposition into a lower-level NG with no coupled constraints, and a higher-level system optimization problem. In the second part of the paper these theoretical results are applied to a coupled NG with coupled constraints as encountered in optical networks. ᭧ 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2007
• Where: AUTOMATICA
• Authors: Lacra Pavel
• Keywords: AUTOMATICA 2007, Coupled Constraints, Optimization Problem, Standard Optimization Setup