A game theoretic analysis of network design with socially-aware users

In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, where connectivity is due to Autonomous Systems’ choices, but also of overlay networks, where each user client can decide the set of connections to establish. Recent works have used game theory, and in particular the concept of Nash Equilibrium, to characterize stable networks created by a set of selfish agents. The majority of these works assume that users are completely non-cooperative, leading, in most cases, to inefficient equilibria. To improve efficiency, in this paper we propose two novel socially-aware network design games. In the first game we incorporate a socially-aware component in the users’ utility functions, while in the second game we use additionally a Stackelberg (leader-follower) approach, where a leader (e.g., the network administrator) architects the desired network buying an appropriat...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: CN
• Authors: Jocelyne Elias, Fabio Martignon, Konstantin Avrachenkov, Giovanni Neglia
• Keywords: CN 2011, Efficient Nash Equilibria, Network Design, Scenarios Network Design