How Leaky Is an Extractor?

This paper discusses the security of a leakage-resilient stream cipher presented at FOCS 2008, instantiated in a practical setting. Based on a case study, we put forward implementation weaknesses that can be exploited in a key-recovery attack. We first show that in our experimental context (8-bit device, Hamming weight leakages, Gaussian noise), a successful attack against the investigated stream cipher has lower data complexity than a similar attack against an unprotected AES implementation. We then analyze the origin of the observed weaknesses and relate them with the implementation of extractor that is used in the investigated stream cipher. We finally discuss the implications of these results for the design of leakage-resilient primitives and provide guidelines to improve the construction of FOCS 2008 and its underlying components.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: LATINCRYPT
• Authors: François-Xavier Standaert
• Keywords: Cryptology, Investigated Stream Cipher, LATINCRYPT 2010, Leakage-resilient Stream Cipher, Stream Cipher