The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games

We consider a model of content contribution in peer-to-peer networks with linear quadratic payoffs and very general interaction patterns. We find that Nash equilibria of this game always exist; moreover, they are computable by solving a linear complementarity problem. The equilibrium is unique when goods are strategic complements or weak substitutes and contributions are proportional to a network centrality measure called the Bonacich index. In the case of public goods, the equilibrium is non-unique and characterized by k-order maximal independent sets. The structure of optimal networks is always star-like when the game exhibits strict or weak complements. Under public good scenarios, while star-like networks remain optimal in the best case, they also yield the worst-performing equilibria. We also discuss a network-based policy for improving the equilibrium performance of networks by the exclusion of a single player.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: WINE
• Authors: Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes
• Keywords: Economy, General Interaction Patterns, Linear Complementarity Problem, Linear Quadratic Payoffs, WINE 2007