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SODA
2010
ACM

Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions

14 years 8 months ago
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the budgets are public, Dobzinski et al [6] show that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality. They further show that this auction is not truthful with private budgets, so that there is no deterministic Pareto-optimal auction with private budgets. Our main contribution is to show the following Budget Monotonicity property of this auction: When there is only one infinitely divisible good, a bidder cannot improve her utility by reporting a budget smaller than the truth. This implies that the adaptive clinching auction is incentive compatible when over-reporting the budget is not possible (for instance, when funds must be shown upfront). We can also make reporting larger budgets suboptimal with ...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag
Added 01 Mar 2010
Updated 02 Mar 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where SODA
Authors Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia
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