Incentivizing peer-assisted services: a fluid shapley value approach

A new generation of content delivery networks for live streaming, video on demand, and software updates takes advantage of a peer-to-peer architecture to reduce their operating cost. In contrast with previous uncoordinated peer-to-peer schemes, users opt-in to dedicate part of the resources they own to help the content delivery, in exchange for receiving the same service at a reduced price. Such incentive mechanisms are appealing, as they simplify coordination and accounting. However, they also increase a user’s expectation that she will receive a fair price for the resources she provides. Addressing this issue carefully is critical in ensuring that all interested parties—including the provider—are willing to participate in such a system, thereby guaranteeing its stability. In this paper, we take a cooperative game theory approach to identify the ideal incentive structure that follows the axioms formulated by Lloyd Shapley. This ensures that each player, be it the provider or a ...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: SIGMETRICS
• Authors: Vishal Misra, Stratis Ioannidis, Augustin Chaintreau, Laurent Massoulié
• Keywords: Content Delivery, Hardware, Ideal Incentive Structure, Incentive Structure, SIGMETRICS 2010