Internet QoS and Regulations

This paper investigates the effects of transition from a single-service class to two-service classes in the Internet. We consider multiple competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who offer network access to a fixed user base, consisting of endusers who differ in their quality requirements and willingness to pay for the access. We model user-ISP interactions as a game in which each ISP makes capacity and pricing decisions to maximize his profits and the end-users only decide which service to buy (if any) and from which ISP. Our model provides robust pricing for networks with single- and two-service classes. Our results indicate that transition to multiple service classes is socially desirable, but could be blocked due to the unfavorable distributional consequences that it inflicts on the existing Internet users. To facilitate the transition, we propose a simple regulatory tool to alleviate the political economic constraints and thus make the transition feasible.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: TON
• Authors: Nikhil Shetty, Galina Schwartz, Jean C. Walrand
• Keywords: Multiple Competing Internet, TON 2010, Two-service Classes, Unfavorable Distributional Consequences