Leakage-Resilient Signatures

The strongest standard security notion for digital signature schemes is unforgeability under chosen message attacks. In practice, however, this notion can be insufficient due to “side-channel attacks” which exploit leakage of information about the secret internal state of the scheme’s hardware implementation. In this work we put forward the notion of “leakage-resilient signatures,” which strengthens the standard security notion by giving the adversary the additional power to learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the secret state that was accessed during every signature generation. This notion naturally implies security against all possible side-channel attacks as long as the amount of information leaked on each invocation is bounded and “only computation leaks information.” The main result of this paper is a construction which gives a (tree-based, stateful) leakage-resilient signature scheme based on any 3-time signature scheme. The amount of information t...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: TCC
• Authors: Sebastian Faust, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Guy N. Rothblum
• Keywords: 3-time Signature Scheme, 3-time Signature Schemes, Cryptography, Digital Signature Schemes, TCC 2010