The paper contains a survey of (mainly unpublished) adaptive logics of inductive generalization. These defeasible logics are precise formulations of certain methods. Some attention is also paid to ways of handling background knowledge, introducing mere conjectures, and the research guiding capabilities of the logics. 1 Aim of this paper This paper describes a variety of adaptive logics of inductive generalization. By a logic I obviously mean a mapping L: ℘(W) → ℘(W), in which W is the set of closed formulas of the standard predicative language L. There is a further requirement for L to be a logic: the selection of CnL(Γ) must be justified by logical means. Moreover, if the logic is to be a formal one, CnL(Γ) must be selected in view of Γ by a formal criterion. The logics are not a contribution to the tradition of Carnapian inductive logic—see for example [14, Ch. 4]. They are logics of inductive generalization in the most straightforward sense of the term, logics that from...