Long-Lived Broadcast Encryption

In a broadcast encryption scheme, digital content is encrypted to ensure that only privileged users can recover the content from the encrypted broadcast. Key material is usually held in a “tamper-resistant,” replaceable, smartcard. A coalition of users may attack such a system by breaking their smartcards open, extracting the keys, and building “pirate decoders” based on the decryption keys they extract. In this paper we suggest the notion of long-lived broadcast encryption as a way of adapting broadcast encryption to the presence of pirate decoders and maintaining the security of broadcasts to privileged users while rendering all pirate decoders useless. When a pirate decoder is detected in a long-lived encryption scheme, the keys it contains are viewed as compromised and are no longer used for encrypting content. We provide both empirical and theoretical evidence indicating that there is a long-lived broadcast encryption scheme that achieves a steady state in which only a sma...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2000
• Where: CRYPTO
• Authors: Juan A. Garay, Jessica Staddon, Avishai Wool
• Keywords: Broadcast Encryption, CRYPTO 2000, Cryptology, Long-lived Broadcast Encryption, Pirate Decoders