An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design

Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents can choose to misrepresent their arrival and departure times, in addition to information about their value for different outcomes. We consider the problem of maximizing the total longterm value of the system despite the self-interest of agents. The online MD problem induces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which when solved can be used to implement optimal policies in a truth-revealing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: NIPS
• Authors: David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh
• Keywords: NIPS 2003, NIPS 2007, Online Md Problem, Online Mechanism Design, Total Longterm Value