Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling

We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design. We assume that the data of each job, namely its release date rj, its processing time pj and its weight wj is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. In communicating with the system, selfish jobs may thus be tempted to manipulate the outcome by lying. Furthermore, we assume a setting without any central scheduling or routing unit. Instead we assume that the jobs themselves need to choose the machine on which they want to be processed. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The mechanism dep...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: IOR
• Authors: Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz
• Keywords: Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Dominant Strategy Equilibrium, IOR 2010, Total Weighted Completion