A memetic framework for describing and simulating spatial prisoner's dilemma with coalition formation

This paper presents a framework for describing the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who play the spatial prisoner’s dilemma with coalition formation. The agent interaction is described by a non-iterated game, where each agent only locally interacts with its neighbours. Every agent may behave as a defector or a cooperator when playing isolated, but they can join or lead coalitions (group of agents) where a leader decides the coalition strategy. Isolated agents’ strategies or groups’ strategies are public and therefore can be memetically imitated by neighbours. The agent strategy is selected between two possibilities: probabilistic Tit-for-Tat (pTFT) or learning automata (LA). Coalition dynamics are organized around two axes. On the one hand, agents get a percentage of compromise when cooperating with other agents. On the other hand, leaders impose taxes to the other agents belonging to its coalition. These two rules and their related parameters guide the co...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Juan C. Burguillo-Rial
• Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, ATAL 2009, Coalition Formation, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Spatial Prisoner Dilemma