Minimal information disclosure with efficiently verifiable credentials

Public-key based certificates provide a standard way to prove one's identity, as attested by some certificate authority (CA). However, plain certificates provide a binary identification: either the whole identity of the subject is known, or nothing is known. We propose using a Merkle hash tree structure, whereby it is possible for a single certificate to contain many separate claims or attributes, each of which may be proved independently, without revealing the others. Additionally, we demonstrate how trees from multiple sources can be combined together by modifying the tree structure. This allows claims by different authorities, such as an employer or professional organization, to be combined under a single certificate, without the CA needing to know (or to verify) all of the claims. In addition to describing the hash tree structure and protocols for constructing and verifying our proposed credential, we formally prove that it provides unforgeability and privacy and we present p...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: DIM
• Authors: David Bauer, Douglas M. Blough, David Cash
• Keywords: Attribute-based Identity Verification, DIM 2008, Hash Tree Structure, Information Management, Tree Structure