Modelling Flexible Social Commitments and Their Enforcement

Abstract. For over a decade, agent research has shown that social commitments support the definition of open multiagent systems by capturing the responsibilities that agents contract toward one another through their communications. These systems, however, rely on the assumption that agents respect the social commitments they adopt. To overcome this limitation, in this paper we investigate the role of sanctions as elements whose enforcement fosters agents’ compliance with adopted commitments. In particular, we present a model of flexible social commitments to which sanctions are attached, and where the enforcement of sanctions act as a social control mechanism for the satisfaction of commitments.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: ESAW
• Authors: Philippe Pasquier, Roberto A. Flores, Brahim Chaib-draa
• Keywords: ESAW 2004, Open Multiagent Systems, Social Commitments, flexible Social Commitments