Modular Security Proofs for Key Agreement Protocols

The security of key agreement protocols has traditionally been notoriously hard to establish. In this paper we present a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for a large class of key agreement protocols. By following a modular approach to proof construction, we hope to enable simpler and less error-prone analysis and proof generation for such key agreement protocols. The technique is compatible with Bellare-Rogaway style models as well as the more recent models of Bellare et al. and Canetti and Krawczyk. In particular, we show how the use of a decisional oracle can aid the construction of proofs of security for this class of protocols and how the security of these protocols commonly reduces to some form of Gap assumption.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: ASIACRYPT
• Authors: Caroline Kudla, Kenneth G. Paterson
• Keywords: ASIACRYPT 2005, Cryptology, Key Agreement Protocols, Modular Approach, Security