Multiagent Graph Coloring: Pareto Efficiency, Fairness and Individual Rationality

We consider a multiagent extension of single-agent graph coloring. Multiple agents hold disjoint autonomous subgraphs of a global graph, and every color used by the agents in coloring the graph has associated cost. In this multiagent graph coloring scenario, we seek a minimum legal coloring of the global graph's vertices, such that the coloring is also Pareto efficient, socially fair, and individual rational. We analyze complexity of individual-rational solutions in special graph classes where classical coloring algorithms are known. Multiagent graph coloring has application to a wide variety of multiagent coordination problems, including multiagent scheduling.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: AAAI
• Authors: Yaad Blum, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Keywords: AAAI 2008, Global Graph, Graph Coloring, Intelligent Agents, Multiagent Graph Coloring