Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. We also show that equilibria under the Alternative Vote Rule do not exhibit multiple candidate clusters and that these equilibria are less polarizing than those under the Plurality Rule. These results differ from those obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy. JEL Codes C72, D72, H11 Keywords Citizen-candidates, Policy Polarization, Approval Voting, Alternative Vote Rule Date: June 4, 201...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2016
• Where: SCW
• Authors: Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak
• Keywords: Applied Computing, SCW 2016