Negotiating efficient outcomes over multiple issues

It is difficult to reach optimal outcomes in bilateral negotiations with multiple issues when the agents' preferences and priorities of the issues are not common knowledge. Selfinterested agents often end up negotiating inefficient agreements in such situations. Some existing multiagent negotiation frameworks involve agents revealing their preferences to a trusted mediator. But in real-life situations, such a third party, trusted by both the agents may not be found. We design a protocol for bilateral multi-issue negotiation. This protocol guarantees envy-free and Pareto optimal agreement with minimum revelation of their preferences when both negotiators are rational and have the same ordinal preferences. This protocol also leads rational agents to envy-free and near-optimal solution in all cases. Categories and Subject Descriptors I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence--Multiagent systems General Terms Performance Keywords Negotiation, multi-issue, ...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Sabyasachi Saha, Sandip Sen
• Keywords: ATAL 2006, Bilateral Multi-issue Negotiation, Frameworks Involve Agents, Intelligent Agents, Preferences