New Security Proofs for the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms

ded abstract of this paper appears in Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, W. Meier and B. Roy editors, Springer-Verlag, 2004. This is the full version. New Security Proofs for the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms Tetsu Iwata Tadayoshi Kohno January 26, 2004 This paper analyses the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity schemes adopted by Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, an emerging standard for third generation wireless communications. The schemes, known as f8 and f9, are based on the block cipher KASUMI. Although previous works claim security proofs for f8 and f9 , where f9 is a generalized versions of f9, it was recently shown that these proofs are incorrect. Moreover, Iwata and Kurosawa (2003) showed that it is impossible to prove f8 and f9 secure under the standard PRP assumption on the underlying block cipher. We address this issue here, showing that it is possible to prove f8 and f9 secure if we make the assumption that the u...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: FSE
• Authors: Tetsu Iwata, Tadayoshi Kohno
• Keywords: Block Cipher, Block Cipher Kasumi, Cryptology, FSE 2004, Security Proofs