Recent distributed denial-of-service attacks on the Internet have been exploiting necessarily open protocols, such as DNS. The Spamhaus attack is one of the largest ever examples of such attacks. Although much research has been conducted to discuss how to mitigate these threats, little has been done to understand why open resolvers exist in the first place. In particular, 60% of the open resolvers have anomalous behavior and causes for their behavior remain a mystery, which hurts mitigation efforts. Our research produces the first detailed investigation of the 17 million anomalous open resolvers and find that these are primarily ADSL modems made by four manufacturers. These devices behave anomalously and respond to DNS queries with the wrong source port due to improper NAT configurations and are unfortunately hard to fix without a concerted effort by ISPs and manufacturers. We also find that anomalous open resolvers are clustered, which has the potential for them to be exploite...
Andrew J. Kaizer, Minaxi Gupta