Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations for the resources if they perceive this to be in their interest. The well-known VCG mechanism allocates the items efficiently, is strategy-proof (agents have no incentive to lie), and never runs a deficit. Nevertheless, the agents may have to make large payments to a party outside the system of agents, leading to decreased utility for the agents. Recent work has investigated the possibility of redistributing some of the payments back to the agents, without violating the other desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Previous research on redistribution mechanisms has resulted in a worst-case optimal redistribution mechanism, that is, a mechanism that maximizes the fraction of VCG payments redistributed in the worst case. In contrast, in this paper, we assume that a prior distribution over the agents' valu...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
• Keywords: ATAL 2008, Discretized Redistribution Mechanism, Intelligent Agents, Linear Redistribution Mechanisms, Redistribution Mechanisms