Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Semantics for a Protocol Security Logic

Abstract. We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious attacker. The approach rests on a new probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics for an existing protocol security logic, replacing an earlier semantics that uses nondeterministic symbolic evaluation. While the basic form of the protocol logic remains unchanged from previous work, there are some interesting technical problems involving the difference between efficiently recognizing and efficiently producing a value, and involving a reinterpretation of standard logical connectives that seems necessary to support certain forms of reasoning.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: ICALP
• Authors: Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Mathieu Turuani
• Keywords: ICALP 2005, Protocol Security, Protocol Security Logic, Protocol Security Properties, Theoretical Computer Science